Authorities around the world, including Singapore, take a tough stance on suspected violations of MARPOL. Violations of MARPOL can, in some instances, lead to very heavy financial penalties on shipowners and vessel managers, while crewmembers can face imprisonment or fines or revocation of the Certificate of Endorsement (CoE) if found guilty.

Most Authorities have implemented MARPOL through their national legislation for prevention of pollution of the sea from ships which makes it a crime for any person to wittingly violate MARPOL. Those liable to prosecution for MARPOL violations include the ship owners, operators, technical managers, crewmembers and shoreside personnel.

MPA expects companies operating its Singapore-registered vessels to understand the risks associated with failing to comply with MARPOL and to adopt a zero-tolerance approach to enforcement.

Illegal practices that result in MARPOL investigations and prosecutions often involve a 'magic pipe' (or flexible hose) bypass of the oily water separator (OWS) or improper discharge of sludge (including oily-water mixtures). Some have involved garbage violations under Annex V of MARPOL. Almost all cases have elements of false statements and records, such as misleading entries in the ship’s Oil Record Book and Garbage Record Book.

A shipowner can be found guilty of MARPOL violations even if it was unaware of the crew’s actions. MPA therefore expects and requires that the shipowner can demonstrate that it has in place adequate environmental policies and procedures to prevent this from happening.

Case study 1 – Illegal discharge of Engine Room bilge waters – in US waters

What happened

Whilst the vessel was berthed at a container terminal, the Second Engineer deliberately discharged oily water from the Engine Room bilge well through the Fire, Bilge, Ballast pump by cracking open the sealed bilge suction valves, bypassing the Oily Water Separator (OWS). The port authorities initiated an emergency response to contain the pollutant. The vessel was subsequently detained, and upon completion of investigations, a lawsuit was served against the Company, the vessel, and its crew. The Chief Engineer and the Second Engineer pleaded guilty to the charges, and each were given probation and prohibition from serving onboard any commercial vessels trading the United States during their terms of probation. The Company pleaded guilty to –

  • (a) Failure to accurately maintain the Oil Record Book;
  • (b) Knowingly discharge oil into waters of the United States in a quantity that may be harmful.

- for which the Company was ordered to pay a criminal penalty of US$3 million, and to serve a four-year probation, during which time, all vessels operated by the Company which call at ports in the United States will be required to implement a robust Environmental Compliance Plan.

How and Why, it happened

The Second Engineer, when taking over the Engine Room watch at 0800AM, noticed that the Engine Room bilge wells were at high level, almost reaching the tank-top, due to an overflow from the Boiler Cascade Tank. Assuming that the water from the Boiler Cascade Tank was clean water, the Second Engineer then decided to reduce the content level of the bilge wells. Although he knew that the act was unsafe and prohibited, the Second Engineer opened the starboard bilge well suction valve to discharge the contents of the bilge wells overboard.

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#1 – Improper sealing. Valves can be cracked open.

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#2 – The Bilge Piping System from the Bilge Well to the Fire, Bilge and Ballast Pump

The Engine Room bilge wells were full with water because of the following events –

  • (i) the freshwater priming valve to the No. 2 Boiler feed water pump was leaking;
  • (ii) the Main Engine air cooler had been cleaned and this had contributed to the aft bilge well showing “High Level”;
  • (iii) previous overflow from the Boiler Cascade Tank;
  • (iv) The Third Engineer, during his duty, had engaged himself in cleaning the No. 2 Auxiliary Engine filters and he was occupied with starting/stopping the Generators required for the use of the ship’s crane; instead of attending and addressing the high bilge wells level;
  • (v) The Fourth Engineer, during his duty, was pre-occupied with monitoring the lube-oil pressure of the No. 3 Generator in use, and he was also engaged in “writing reports” on “previous overhauling of machinery/equipment”.

Case study 2 – Illegal discharge of bilge waters using ‘magic pipe’ – Off Myanmar

What happened

A Second Officer, acting on information provided by a concerned Engine Room Rating, notified his Company’s Superintendent through photographs showing an illegal discharge carried out overboard. The Company then conducted a shipboard investigation into the whistle-blowing incident.

The Company’s investigation revealed that the engineers, under the instruction of the Chief Engineer, had used a “magic pipe” and “flexible hose” to discharge waters from the Engine Room bilge tank directly to the sea, bypassing the OWS. A connection – “the magic pipe” - was fabricated to discharge the said-waters through the flange of the pressure gauge of the ballast water stripping eductor line.

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#1 – use of “flexible hose” and “magic pipe” from sounding pipe of Bilge Tank to the eductor system

How and Why, it happened

The reason for bypassing the OWS and discharging directly overboard were –

  • (i) Shorter time to discharge the said waters;
  • (ii) To reduce maintenance time/cost and running hours of the OWS;
  • (iii)Engineers and ratings were coerced into performing the illegal acts, due to fear of losing their jobs

Case study 3 – Garbage disposal in Great Barrier Reef, Australia

What happened

During an AMSA inspection at Brisbane, Australia, the Singapore-registered vessel received four deficiencies including one detainable deficiency (code 30) which are related to the discharge of food waste inside Australia’s “NO MARPOL discharge areas”.

The deficiencies in question are –

  • (i) PSC Code: 10127: Action Code taken: 17: Passage Plan does not identify and consider the marine environmental protection measures that apply for the voyage.
  • (ii) PSC Code: 14599: Action Code taken: 17: Non-comminuted food wastes were discharged into the sea within a prohibited distance from the nearest land and not in accordance with MARPOL Annex V, as recorded in the garbage record book on two separate occasions, 01st of July 2022 and 25th of August 2022.
  • (iii) PSC Code: 14503: Action Code taken: 17: Ship’s crew not familiar with the discharge requirements of food waste documented in the Garbage management plan and MARPOL Annex V.
  • (iv) PSC Code: 15106: Action code taken: 30: Ship’s crew not familiar with the discharge requirements of food waste documented in the Garbage management plan and MARPOL Annex V.

How and Why, it happened

AMSA officers had found that entries in the Ship’s Garbage Logbook showed that the vessel had discharged non-comminuted food wastes within the “NO MARPOL discharge areas” on two separate occasions.

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#1 – On 1st July 2022, the vessel discharged food wastes in position 24° 34.5’ S/ 153° 35.6’ E, which lies within 2 nm of the nearest land line of the NE coordinates of Australia.

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#1 – On 25th August 2022, the vessel discharged food wastes in position 24° 42.08’ S/ 153° 36.78’ E, which lies within 5.6 nm of the nearest land line of the NE coordinates of Australia.

Due to the lapse on the part of the officer planning the passage which was overlooked by the Master and the Chief Officer, specific information about the extent of the “no discharge area” was not clearly displayed on the navigation charts used. This had led to the Chief Officer to approve the discharge at these prohibited areas on the above-mentioned dates.

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#1 – Vessel’s crew misinterpretation and erroneous understanding of the term “nearest land line”

In addition to the inadequate instructions in the Company’s procedures, the Shipboard Internal procedure also did not clearly mention the 12nm requirement from the nearest land line, beyond which the non-comminuted food wastes could be discharged.

There were no specific instructions by the Master or Chief officer on the special restrictions on the vessel’s voyage route regarding garbage disposal. The Officer(s) on watch exhibited inadequate understanding of MARPOL Annex V, Regulations of discharging food wastes 12 nm away from the Nearest Land line in the Great Barrier Reef region, and on one of the occasions, the Officer was engaged in cargo planning and had misjudged the distance from land.

The Deficiencies provided objective evidence that there is a serious failure of implementation of ISMC/S7 element 7 and procedures onboard for ensuring protection of the marine environment from garbage pollution.

Operational best practice

The following are some of the best practices to address the issues and to prevent recurrence: -

  • The Company’s/Ship’s environmental compliance policy implementing 'zero pollution' culture
  • A clear environmental mission statement that places proper waste management practices above cost savings and operational expediency
  • A no-blame culture, with open reporting of all illegal practices
  • shore-side management supervision, with a senior person in the company responsible for environmental compliance reporting to the chief executive and/or to the board
  • Procedures and guidance on equipment control, planned inspection and maintenance regimes
  • Establishing a robust monitoring regime and recognising the critical role of ship superintendents in checking compliance with environmental procedures and detailed analysis of discharge records through oil record books and the ship’s documentation
  • Effective on-board management of oil waste systems by the chief engineer and master
  • Installation of the most up-to-date equipment with an effective maintenance programme, prompt procurement of spares, adequate holding tank capacity and shoreside discharge facilities, if required
  • Periodic testing and calibration of equipment and tamper-proof measures to make bypassing difficult and detectable
  • Accurate and honest documentation of oil waste management practices, with prompt reporting of any problems to shoreside management for possible escalation to flag or port authorities
  • Formal training on MARPOL requirements, both on board and ashore – this should be provided on a regular basis and be supported by safety publications
  • Briefing crew on the implications related to falsification of records and MARPOL violations
  • Audits and inspections for MARPOL compliance conducted by superintendents and external inspectors, with proper testing of equipment and interviews with engineering crew – results should be clearly documented for review by senior management, with recommendations for improvements.

Conclusion

Rigorous training and supervision, regular auditing and effective senior management oversight are key to ensuring MARPOL compliance. The most effective way to mitigate risk in this area is maintaining a company-wide culture of compliance among, and co-operation and trust between, both ship and shoreside staff that is actively promoted by senior management. MARPOL best practice must be treated as the highest priority, rather than as simply another operational process.