On 06 March 2018, a Singapore registered ship was en-route from Singapore to Suez Canal when fire was detected in its No.3 Cargo Hold. At the time of the incident, the ship was in the Arabian Sea, about 900 nautical miles from the west coast of India. As a result of the fire incident onboard, five (5) lives were lost.

The incident underlined the importance for every stakeholder on the logistics supply chain to play their part to ensure proper packing, planning and stowage of cargo and to take the necessary precautionary measures to prevent a fire on board, particularly when handling dangerous goods. Effective implementation of the company’s Safety Management System including effective training for the ship’s crew to tackle a cargo fire is essential for every ship especially when carrying dangerous goods.

In an investigation report published by Transport Safety Investigation Bureau of Singapore (TSIB)¹, it was reported that the most likely source of the fire originated from the decomposition of dangerous goods onboard, generating intense heat and enabling the fire to rapidly develop and become out of control.

The report mentioned that cargo stowed on board the ship followed the relevant rules of stowage and segregation as per the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code.

¹The TSIB (Transport Safety Investigation Bureau) is the air, marine and rail accidents and incidents investigation authority in Singapore. Its mission is to promote transport safety through the conduct of independent investigations into air, marine and rail accidents and incidents.

Probable causes

The ship was carrying around 1,000 tonnes of SDID (Sodium Dichloroisocyanurate Dihydrate) in addition to other cargo, which was stowed in a block stowage of 54 containers in No.3 Cargo Hold.

Though a fire forensic expert was engaged for an investigation, it was not possible to decisively determine the root cause of the fire. However, correlating the chlorine-smell smoke noticed by the crew at the onset of the event, and other evidence assessed by the fire forensic expert, it was possible that one or more containers in No.3 Cargo Hold containing SDID were compromised as a result of self-decomposition. The block stowage of the SDID further exacerbated the rate of reaction and heat production which resulted in an uncontrollable spread of the fire.

According to the investigation report, SDID may decompose at lower temperatures (as low as 50°C or even lower) and it could be possible that such decomposition can result in a thermal runaway and an exothermic reaction.

Stowage Consideration for IMDG Cargoes Associated with Secondary Risk on Oxidising Properties

There were 54 containers stowed inside the No.3 Cargo Hold carrying SDID, which were classified as Class 9 dangerous goods in accordance with the IMDG Code. The investigation report indicated that this classification did not identify the secondary hazard of chemical decomposition/instability within the IMDG Code. In the event of a fire involving such cargo, firefighting response requires the use of abundant water, as recommended in the Emergency Schedules Guide of the IMDG Code.

Despite the associated secondary hazards, SDID was stowed under-deck where the primary fixed firefighting system was fixed CO2 system which may be ineffective to suppress or extinguish fires associated with such cargo. In addition, the report identified limitations of flooding the cargo hold with abundant water as recommended based on existing SOLAS requirements.

The investigation report suggested that in the interim SOLAS regulations are amended, loading of dangerous goods with oxidising properties especially those with secondary hazards of chemical decomposition to be stowed on-deck, and away from direct sunlight, where water could be used more effectively. Cargo planning officers, when planning the stowage of IMDG Cargo, should take into consideration the type of shipboard firefighting arrangement for cargo holds as indicated in the ship’s Document of Compliance under SOLAS Reg II-2 for the carriage of IMDG cargo. Strict attention should also be paid to the related cargo characteristics based on its UN number of each consignment under the provision of IMDG Code, as well as information on the most relevant emergency response specified in the shipper’s documentation submitted to the ship as required by part 5.4.3 of IMDG Code.

The full TSIB investigation report could be found at the link: Click Here