Engine Room Fire

A container ship was transiting along the African coast and on Unattended Machinery Space (UMS) status with the engine room unmanned. Arrangement was provided for the UMS system's alarm to sound in all common areas around the ship and the Duty Engineer's cabin. As usual, the 2nd Engineer (2/E) conducted his routine night patrol in the engine room at 10pm before calling it a day. The 2/E was awakened from his sleep by an alarm 3 hours later. Just as he was about to leave his cabin, the fire alarm sounded. The Chief Engineer (C/E) and 2/E proceeded down to the engine room. The 2nd Officer (2/O) who was on navigational watch confirmed it was a fire alarm, indicating fire in the engine room. The C/E stayed in the engine control room, while the 2/E went to the vicinity of the auxiliary engine (A/E) to verify the cause of the alarm. There was no abnormality detected in the vicinity of A/E, but the area was smoky. The 2/E immediately returned to the control room and shut down that particular A/E. The 2/E had intended to return to the A/E but realised that the fire had broken out and was too big to be put out by fire extinguishers. After a brief discussion with the Master, the C/E decided to shut down the main engine and made preparations to release CO₂ into the engine room. The ship personnel also started 'boundary cooling' on the forward and aft part of the accommodation block. The usual entrance to the engine room was impassable as black smoke was now filling the engine room. C/E and 2/E had to exit the engine room via the emergency escape which is a trunk space with a vertical ladder that leads up to the main deck via a small hatch opening. When all crew were mustered and accounted for, the Master ordered the CO₂ release. However, 32 out of 165 CO₂ bottles designated for the engine room could not be deployed. Without propulsion and electrical power, save only for those services that are essential for safety in an emergency and powered by the emergency generator, the ship drifted in the ocean until the arrival of a salvage tug. While the incident was handled professionally by the ship personnel, investigations revealed some safety lapses that could be prevented.

1. The burnt out A/E showed evidence of fire concentrating at the cylinder area with fuel oil staining on the side casing. Fuel oil was the likely precursor for the fire. On closer examination, it was noticed that a securing bracket was also missing.
2. The leaked fuel oil line at the fuel injector pump of the A/E's cylinder caused the fuel oil to spray onto the exposed assembly heat shield which subsequently flowed down to the exposed exhaust manifold.
3. The missing securing bracket could have caused the fuel oil line at the fuel injector pump to become loosened over time due to vibration.


The burnt out Aux Engine


The securing bracket was missing from the fuel pump assembly
4. Both C/E and 2/E experienced difficulty in opening the hatch door of the emergency escape from inside the space, delaying their escape. The hatch door was eventually opened from the outside by the ship's crew. The outcome could have been disastrous if there was any further delay in opening of the escape hatch.


Engine room escape trunk


Hatch door (red)
5. When activating the CO₂ system, 32 out of 165 CO₂ bottles could not be activated. It was revealed that the activating heads of these bottles were corroded, causing them to be seized. Since the last renewal servicing of the CO₂ installation, the ship's records showed inspections and measurements carried out by the C/E and Third Engineer (3/E) as part of the vessel's monthly, quarterly and annual planned maintenance system (PMS). Corrosion build-up would have taken some time. It appeared that nobody had noticed the corrosion, or there could also be a possibility that they were thinking that no maintenance needed to be carried out until the next servicing.


Activating head successfully deployed


Activating head that seized

1. Ship owners, ship managers and masters are advised to bring to the attention of the ship's crew the importance of routine checks, vigilant detection and early reporting of any faulty or malfunction of systems, equipment or appliances particularly those concerning safety, life-saving and fire-fighting, to enable prompt servicing and maintenance.
2. Companies are encouraged to refer to MSC.1/Circ.1318 on Guidelines for the Maintenance and Inspections of Fixed CO₂ Fire Extinguishing Systems and the Merchant Shipping (Safety Convention) Regulation. MPA has also recently issued an advisory on the maintenance and inspection of the fixed CO₂ firefighting extinguishing system and engine room escape hatch door. For more information, company can refer to Shipping Circular No. 12 of 2017.