Performance under Port State Control

Thanks to the collective efforts of our stakeholders and seafarers on Singapore ships, the Singapore Registry of Ships (SRS) has continued to do well under Port State Control (PSC) in the first half of this year.

• Under the Tokyo MOU Regime, SRS’ detention ratio was 1.52% against the regime’s average of 4.44%.

• Under the Paris MOU Regime, SRS’ detention ratio was 1.02% against the regime’s average of 3.84%.

• In addition, the SRS improved its position in the Tokyo and Paris MOU White List, and was ranked 4th and 14th respectively based on its 2013 results.

After a 3-year wait, the SRS qualifies again for the US Coast Guard’s QUALSHIP 21 programme this year with a 3-year rolling average detention ratio of 0.96%.

Ship detentions in Australia

As of 1^st June 2014, a total of 20 Singapore ships were detained under PSC worldwide. Almost 50% of these detentions took place in Australia, mainly due to the following common deficiencies:

• Improper adjustment or resetting of lifeboat on-load release gears (hydrostatic interlock) and cracks in lifeboat

• Defective oil filtering equipment

• Defective engine room fire damper

• Defective MF/HF radio installation

• Seizure of cargo hold hatch cover securing devices

• Ineffective implementation of safety management system related to maintenance of ship and critical shipboard operations (safety of navigation, records of seafarers’ hours of rest and operation of GMDSS equipment).

All ship detentions were thoroughly investigated by the MPA and the grounds for detentions by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) were found valid. Upon request, AMSA also cooperated by providing the MPA with supporting evidence to facilitate the investigations.

Preventing fatal lifeboat accidents

Despite the heightened focus of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the introduction of additional mandatory requirements and guidance¹ to prevent fatal lifeboat accidents, some ships are still being found with glaring deficiencies in their lifeboat on-load release gears. Investigations have revealed the following safety deficiencies:

• Ship’s crew not familiar with the operation and resetting of lifeboat on-load release systems

• Inadequate on-board training and familiarisation

• Poor quality of maker’s instruction and training manuals for inspection and operation of lifeboat on-load release system

• Ineffective inspection of lifeboat and on-load release systems by ship’s crew

• Substandard service rendered by lifeboat service providers during annual thorough examination and operational testing of lifeboat launching appliances and on-load release gears. The quality of their work was not verified by the ship’s senior officers.

• Lack of attention and/or verification of the setting of lifeboat on-load release system by surveyors during safety equipment surveys.

Shipowners and masters are advised to make use of the IMO Guidelines as listed herein to enhance their shipboard procedures, instruction manuals and checklists to ensure that their crew are adequately trained and familiarised in carrying out effective inspection, testing and maintenance of lifeboat and on-load release systems on board their ships.